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Abstract
It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between expressivism and
normative realism: more precisely, that the two views offer conflicting explanations
of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between
normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence
thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue
that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a minimalist approach to
the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any
explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism.
A specter is haunting metaethics the specter of a convergence between an expressivist
account of normative thought and language and a realist conception of normativity.1
The “quasi-realist” project of appropriating commitments traditionally associated with
realism e.g., that there are objective normative facts, of which we are good judges by
interpreting them as first-order normative claims, amenable to an expressivist account,
might have been too successful: it seems to have made expressivists unable to state in
what sense their view is an anti-realist one, as originally advertised.
Metaethicists of all stripes, including expressivists, have tried to exorcise this specter.
In particular, many have argued that we can still articulate an explanatory conflict be-
tween expressivism and realism. The two views might converge in their theses about truth,
objectivity or knowledge, it is said, but they are divided in how they explain important
facts about our normative beliefs and linguistic practice: realists rely on normative facts
and properties in their explanations, while expressivists appeal instead to our affective
and practical reactions to the natural world.
In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory divide between ex-
pressivism and realism. Expressivism is compatible with any explanation that could be
reasonably attributed to realists in general at least given a minimalist approach to the
relevant metaphysical and semantic notions. It is only in conflict with a representation-
alist account of the etiology of normative thought and language, but such an account
cannot be a criterion for realism: many self-professed realists, and in particular most
non-naturalist realists, do not purport to offer a causal explanation of the emergence of
normative concepts as representational devices.
1I will focus here on practical normativity the space of values and norms governing our actions and
action-directed mental states (desires, emotions, plans, etc.) not more narrowly on morality, nor on a
general notion of normativity that includes theoretical or epistemic rationality. For brevity, from here on
I will use normative and normativity to mean practically normative and practical normativity.
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1 Expressivism, objectivity, and realism
First, let me recount how the idea of an explanatory conflict came to be seen as the best
hope for drawing a divide between expressivism and realism.
Suppose a naturalistic investigation into why creatures like us developed a normative
language delivered the following answers:
Negative Functional Thesis Normative terms do not have the function of tracking
normative facts, or any other kind of facts.2
Positive Functional Thesis Normative terms have the function of conveying and
stabilizing our conative attitudes,3 for the purposes of solving coordination
problems in social contexts.
Let us also suppose that the function of normative terms is implemented through se-
mantic connections between normative expressions and conative attitudes, at least at the
sentential level:
Semantic Thesis Normative claims semantically express conative attitudes.4
I will call the conjunction of these three claims Expressivism, as they are the core tenets
of the expressivist theories developed by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard in recent
decades.5
Now take the following thesis:
Objectivity There are objective normative facts and many of our beliefs about them
are true.
2Function is used here in an etiological, non-normative sense: x is among the functions of a mental or
linguistic item, in this etiological sense, if being or doing x plays a role in the best causal explanation of the
emergence and proliferation of items of that kind. Tracking is the kind of covariation between mental and
linguistic items and features of the world that would causally explain the emergence and proliferation of
said items as representational devices. Cf. Allan Gibbard’s (1990, Ch. 6) notion of natural representation,
and his thesis that normative discourse is not naturally representational, or the notion of e-representation
articulated in Huw Price (2013), pp. 35-8. See O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996) and Sinclair (2006)
for arguments to the effect that this negative functional thesis is the best way to articulate the core
negative insight of expressivism in a minimalist framework.
3By conative attitudes I mean affective and action-guiding mental states, e.g. mental states of norm-
acceptance, planning, or attitudes of approval and disapproval.
4For instance, if asked what someone said by uttering “Genocide is wrong,” we can correctly answer
by saying that she expressed her disapproval of genocide, or some other conative attitude.
5I do not want to suggest that all self-described expressivists would accept these three theses. In this
paper I am interested in Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s “quasi-realist” projects, and their relation to realism.
Not only the Semantic Thesis, but also the functional theses stated above or at least close versions
thereof are central to these projects.
In recent years many versions of expressivism have been proposed that abandon the project of offering
a psychologistic semantics for normative discourse. Some of these views articulate the expressive function
of normative discourse in pragmatic terms, e.g. Bar-On and Chrisman (2009), Bar-On (2012), Bar-On and
Sias (2013), and Yalcin (2012). Others restate expressivism as a meta-semantic view, i.e. as an account
of why normative expressions have the meanings that they do, or of what it is for a normative expression
to have a certain semantic value. See Suikkanen (2009a); Horwich (2010), Essay 9; Silk (2013); Charlow
(2014); Pérez Carballo (2014); and Ridge (2014), among others. Moreover, some of these meta-semantic
expressivist views allow that the meanings of normative claims are precisely those assigned to them by a
standard truth-conditional semantics. It is not my goal here to explore the relation between expressivism
in all these different guises and normative realism. Indeed, I doubt that any unified answer could be
given to such a question. My focus, again, is on the idea that there is an explanatory conflict between
quasi-realism, as developed by Blackburn and Gibbard, and realism. But I will discuss issues about
meta-semantic explanation in section 6, where I examine the possibility of drawing a divide between
Expressivism and realism in terms of their explanations of semantic content.
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And let us understand objectivity as attitude-independence: a normative fact is objective
in this sense if it is counterfactually and constitutively independent of our attitudes. For
instance, in claiming that it is an objective fact that genocide is wrong we are saying
that: (i) it would be wrong no matter what we thought or felt about it; and (ii) it is not
wrong in virtue of our attitudes towards it, but rather because of, e.g., the unnecessary
suffering, loss of human life and violation of rights that it involves.6
Is Objectivity compatible with Expressivism? If the Semantic Thesis entailed
that we do not have normative beliefs with factual or truth-apt contents which is what
old-school emotivists used to think7 the answer would clearly be no, since in that case
we could not be committed to any normative facts at all, and a fortiori to any objective
normative facts.
However, expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard reject any such implications. By
adopting minimalist notions of truth, facthood, and belief notions that would apply
to any superficially assertoric discourse in virtue of its syntactical structure and logical
discipline they have come to embrace such commitments as: it is true that genocide is
wrong; the claim that genocide is wrong describes the fact that genocide is wrong; or more
generally, there are normative facts and many of our beliefs about such facts are true. On
a minimalist account, such claims are mere endorsements of first-order normative verdicts.
Thus, they are not only compatible with the Semantic Thesis, but are amenable to an
expressivist account themselves, like any other normative claim. Moreover, Blackburn
and Gibbard have given an expressivist account of objectivity claims. Our attitudes
toward certain actions or states of affairs, they point out, remain the same even when
we think of scenarios in which our attitudes are different: for instance, we disapprove of
genocide even when we consider a possible world in which we ourselves do not disapprove
of it. (Indeed, we also disapprove of the possible selves of ours who do not disapprove
of genocide.) And it is such unconditional attitudes that we express when we say, for
example, that genocide would be wrong no matter what anyone thought or felt about it,
or that it is an objective fact that genocide is wrong.8 Or so the minimalist-expressivist
story goes.
Other philosophers have argued that, even if we accept the broad minimalism sketched
above, Expressivism is nevertheless incompatible with Objectivity. This would be
because the Semantic Thesis entails, in some way or another, the attitude-dependence
6Note that, while certain versions of subjectivism or relativism about normativity (e.g., rigidified
subjectivism and assessor relativism) might be able to accommodate the modal robustness of normative
judgments by tying their correctness to our actual attitudes and beliefs, such views will be incompatible
with normative objectivity understood in the constitutive sense. In this paper I am assuming that
Expressivism is compatible with this more robust kind of objectivity. I am also putting aside worries to
the effect that Expressivism is in tension with other ways in which the objectivity of normative truths,
broadly understood, is manifested in our practice: for instance, that it cannot account for our ordinary
reactions in cases of normative disagreement see Enoch (2011), Ch. 2; Parfit (2011), Ch. 28; Scanlon
(2014), Lecture 3 or for the possibility of fundamental normative error, as Egan (2007) argues.
7See Ayer (1936) or Stevenson (1944). Gibbard (1990) too argued that normative discourse is not
factual or truth-apt, taking natural representationality to be a necessary condition for the factuality of
a region of discourse. In what follows I will focus on the more recent version of Gibbard’s expressivism,
which abandons this narrow conception of factuality and truth-aptness in favor of a deflationary one.
8See Blackburn (1993), Essay 8; Blackburn (1998a), Ch. 9; or Gibbard (2003), Ch. 9. Blackburn sim-
ilarly offers an internal reading of objectivity claims understood as concerning the constitutive attitude-
independence of normative facts: “[W]hat makes cruelty abhorrent is not that it offends us, but all those
hideous things that make it do so.” (1993, p. 172)
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of normative truths.9 But let us put aside such worries here. Blackburn and Gibbard have
argued on many occasions that their attitudinal semantics does not have such subjectivist
consequences,10 and the issue I want to discuss arises precisely once we assume these
problems away.
Let us assume then that Expressivism is compatible with Objectivity. If we were
also to accept that Objectivity is the defining tenet of normative realism, this would
mean that Expressivism has converged with a conception of normativity that it was
long thought to rival.
Some of us might be happy with this result. Insofar as we have some pretheoretical
grip on what it is to be a realist about normativity, Objectivity arguably comes close to
capturing it. And the dissolution of a long-standing philosophical divide is usually treated
as a sign of progress. Moreover, realists might derive benefits from this convergence.11
Putting aside all the flowcharts that will have gone to waste, it is hard to think of reasons
why we should try to keep alive the conflict between expressivism and realism. Expres-
sivists themselves have flirted with accepting the collapse of this divide. Blackburn, for
instance, has often argued that on his view normative facts are as real and objective as
they can be, and that there is no intelligible form of realism that delivers more robust
metaphysical commitments.12
Alas, the general mood among philosophers engaging with this topic has been less
ecumenical. It is widely believed that, despite the compatibility of Expressivism and
Objectivity, there must be some divide between Expressivism and realism in other
words, that there is some set of commitments that go beyond Objectivity and make
one a genuine realist, and which expressivists cannot accept. Moreover, Blackburn and
Gibbard themselves routinely make such pronouncements; they call their view “quasi-
realist,” to mark its enduring anti-realist character, and hold that realism does not have
a monopoly on truth and objectivity. But what are the further commitments that define
genuine realism, and how exactly are they in conflict with Expressivism?
In response to this question, it does not help to point out that most self-professed
realists, as a matter of fact, reject Expressivism. This only makes our question more
pressing. What we are asking is whether realists must reject any of the theses of Ex-
pressivism, for reasons intrinsic to being a realist. If most realists happen to find Ex-
pressivism implausible, but for reasons that have nothing to do with their realism, that
does not mean that the two views are incompatible only that their supporters happen
to disagree on whether Expressivism is true.
9See Jackson and Pettit (1998), Peacocke (2004), and Suikkanen (2009b), among others.
10See, for instance, Blackburn (1999) for a discussion focused on this issue. Schroeder (2014) discusses
the arguments cited in fn. 9 and argues that they are all based on the same mistake: they conflate the
assertibility conditions of normative claims which are attitude-dependent, in the same sense in which
assertibility conditions are belief -dependent for ordinary descriptive claims and their truth conditions,
which need not be attitude-dependent.
11Expressivists have long argued that their view avoids, or has good answers to, traditional problems
faced by realism, e.g. epistemological challenges, or explaining the motivational force of normative judg-
ment. If their “quasi-realism” is indistinguishable from at least some versions of realism, then realists
could share in these benefits as well.
12See Blackburn (1998b), pp. 296, 319; or Blackburn (2005), pp. 117-21. Gibbard too sometimes
suggests that non-naturalist realists might end up accepting expressivism (2003, p. 186; 2012, p. 229),
and has even tried to accommodate some of the commitments of naturalist realism (2003, Ch. 5).
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At this point, someone might suggest that we have an easy way of describing the
divide between Expressivism and realism, or at least between Expressivism and robust
realism: expressivists only accept Objectivity and other realist-sounding commitments
in virtue of adopting a minimalist account of the notions of truth and facthood, while
genuine realists understand these notions in a robust metaphysical sense. In other words,
according to this proposal, while Expressivism may be compatible with minimal or
non-metaphysical realism,13 it is in conflict with realism stated in terms of metaphysical
notions such as robust correspondence truth.14
However, this does not give us a divide that both realists and expressivists must recog-
nize. Self-professed robust realists may well think that their metaphysical commitments
are not amenable to a minimalist treatment, and thus that their realism goes beyond the
ersatz version available to expressivists. But a thoroughgoing minimalist will deny that
claims about truths and facts could mean more than what his minimalism takes them
to mean. Blackburn, for instance, does not allow for a difference between minimal and
robust metaphysical commitments: his commitments to truth and objectivity, minimally
understood, are as robust as they can intelligibly be.15 Again, robust realists might resist
such claims, but if we are to find a stable divide between Expressivism and realism
that minimalist expressivists can recognize, we need a test for realism that goes beyond
metaphysical foot-stomping. That is, we must articulate a conflict between the two views
that would persist even if we treated all talk of normative truths, facts and properties as
internal to first-order normative discourse, in the way that minimalist expressivists do.
This is the challenge that has become known, due to Jamie Dreier (2004), as the problem
of creeping minimalism.
2 The promise of an explanatory divide
Blackburn and Gibbard often articulate the differences between their “quasi-realism” and
genuine realism in explanatory terms: realists start with normative facts and explain our
normative beliefs and linguistic practice by reference to those facts, they say. Expres-
13That is, the kind of realism espoused by Nagel (1986), Dworkin (1996), or Scanlon (2010, 2014), who
either reject ontological commitments to normative facts and properties, or claim that such commitments
should be understood as first-order normative claims. Blackburn (1996) was among the first to claim that
Dworkin-style realism is indistinguishable from his quasi-realism. Svavarsdottir (2001) also argues that
a metaphysically deflated normative realism like Nagel’s, which she characterizes as “a position reached
within ethical inquiry” (p. 170), might be compatible with expressivism. Most recently, Dreier (2015) has
suggested that Scanlon’s realism need not be in tension with expressivism.
14Cuneo (2013): “[A] commitment to the deflationary package is an important respect in which expres-
sivist and realist views seem to differ; expressivists accept the package, while realists do not” (p. 227).
15Blackburn (2006): “Minimalism denies that some true assertions ‘literally’ correspond with the world,
while other true assertions only manage something less.” (p. 160) This, he says, should bring “aid and
comfort to the quasi-realist. It means that there are no thoughts about truth that lie beyond his grasp.”
(ibid.) In the same spirit, minimal realists often deny the intelligibility of adding any metaphysical
weight onto the normative commitments that constitute their realism. For instance, Dworkin (1996)
insists that seemingly metaphysical claims about moral facts being out there, or positing the existence of
moral properties in the universe, can only be interpreted as benign normative claims, so that his realism
“knows no bounds (...) [T]here is no more robust thesis for any realism to deploy or any anti-realism to
refute, no more metaphysical a meta-ethics for the former to embrace or the latter to mock.” (pp. 127-8)
Similarly, Scanlon (2014) rejects the idea that his realism is “minimalist” in any way: on his view, he
says, normative facts are as robust as they can be, and his account gives normative statements “exactly
the content and ‘thickness’ that they require when taken literally” (p. 28).
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sivists, in contrast, do without normative facts in their explanations of normative thought
and language, appealing instead to our affective and practical reactions to non-normative
phenomena; even though they accept claims about objective normative truths and facts,
such claims come at the end of the expressivist project and are explanatorily idle.
Here is Blackburn (1993), describing this alleged explanatory conflict between expres-
sivism and realism:
“[T]he expressivist will say that there are ethical truths, and even that they
are independent of us and our desires. But it is confusing to call the position
realist, (...) because at no point does it regard our behavior in that area as
explained by any kind of awareness of an area of reality, or a real feature or
property of things. It is here that ‘quasi’ comes in: we end up saying things
that sound superficially distinctive of realism, but the explanation of what we
are doing in saying them and of how we get to say them is different.”16
This divide is meant to be recognizable from a minimalist standpoint. That is, accord-
ing to this proposal, even if realists accepted a minimalist treatment of the notions of
truth, facthood, etc., they would still attach an explanatory role to normative facts and
properties, e.g. to the wrongness of genocide, which expressivists cannot accept. Other
philosophers have similarly tried to draw a contrast between Expressivism and realism
in explanatory terms, focusing on various explananda for this purpose: from truthmaking
relations to facts about semantic content and normative disagreement.17
My goal in this paper is to show that, if we assume a minimalist approach to the
relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, no explanatory commitment is both plausible
as a criterion for realism and incompatible with Expressivism. More precisely, I will
argue that Expressivism is compatible with any realist explanation that expressivists
themselves would find intelligible, except for a representationalist account of the etiology
of normative thought and language which cannot be accepted, however, as a general
test for realism.18
Perhaps the biggest challenge in any discussion about whether Expressivism is com-
patible with realism is that we have no firm, widely shared grip on what realism is. The
16Blackburn (1993), p. 98, his italics. The same Blackburn (1993): “[T]he existence of facts explains
the way in which our knowledge expands and progresses: here an explanatory role seems to carry with it
an ontological commitment which (...) is surely problematic to the quasi-realist” (p. 18). Anti-realism, he
says, explains normative discourse and its role in our lives “while avoiding the view that it exists because
it describes a genuine aspect of reality” (p. 7). This understanding of realism in explanatory terms was
already present in Blackburn (1984), where realists were attributed the thesis that values and duties “are
themselves part of the genesis of our beliefs. It would be because values, etc. are distributed in some way
around the world, and because we are capable of reacting to them (...) that we moralize as we do.” (pp.
181-2) Expressivists, in contrast, aim to “explain the practice of moralizing, using causal language, and
so on, in terms only of our exposure to a thinner reality” (p. 169). See also Gibbard (2011): “[The realist]
is asking about something he starts out thinking to be a fact (...) Its being a candidate fact is supposed
to figure centrally in explaining how to judge it. (...) [Quasi-realists] can’t (...) mimic the claim that
understanding normative properties and relations as objective matters of fact is basic to explaining how
judgments of wrongness work.” (pp. 45-6)
17Fine (2001), Dreier (2004), Jenkins (2005), Asay (2013), and Dunaway (Forthcoming).
18To be clear, I am not assuming that, for there to be an explanatory divide between Expressivism
and realism, all realists should accept the same explanation of the relevant facts. It would be enough if,
for instance, naturalist realists offered a causal explanation of our beliefs, while non-naturalists offered a
non-causal one, as long as both explanations were incompatible with Expressivism. My thesis is that,
for any plausible explanandum, Expressivism is at most incompatible with a narrow set of realist views.
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notion of realism is notoriously problematic in philosophy, and nowhere is it more dis-
puted than in metaethics.19 Thus, I enter this debate with ambivalence. On one hand, I
find it valuable to explore the compatibility between Expressivism and the many faces
of realism. On the other hand, I want to avoid the trap of treating realism as something
the sharp contours of which we should all be able to recognize upon reflection.
Here is what I will do: I will examine various notions of realism, defined in terms
of the explanatory role that they attach to normative facts and properties, or that they
deny to our attitudes. I will not ask whether any of these notions precisely captures
genuine realism. I will claim, however, that certain explanatory criteria are too narrow to
be plausible as general tests for realism. The fact that the notion of realism is imprecise
need not prevent us from making such judgments. We may not agree on an exact definition
of normative realism, but I hope we can agree that any criterion for normative realism
should cover non-naturalist realism. This is what I will rely on in making my case. The
only explanatory project incompatible with Expressivism is, I will argue, an account
of normative thought and language according to which normative facts and properties
causally explain the emergence of normative concepts as representational devices. But
this explanatory commitment can only be attributed to certain naturalist realist views,
and perhaps to one particular version of non-naturalist realism as well. It leaves out
most non-naturalist realists. Thus, we can conclude that there is no explanatory divide
between Expressivism and anything recognizable as a general notion of realism.20
I should make it clear, however, that my arguments for this conclusion will be made
from a perspective that many self-professed realists would reject. The question I’m in-
terested in is whether Blackburn and Gibbard are right, by their own lights, to see a
divide between Expressivism and realism. Thus, I will engage with potential criteria for
realism from a minimalist-expressivist standpoint: that is, I will treat any talk of norma-
tive truths, facts, and properties as internal to normative discourse and amenable to an
expressivist account. For a thoroughgoing minimalist, there is no further metanormative
level at which the realism debate could be carried out, at a remove from the subversive
impact of minimalism. It is from this minimalist standpoint that Blackburn and Gibbard
claim to have identified an explanatory divide between their view and realism. I will rely
on the same standpoint in making the case that they were wrong to think so.
Some contributors to this debate might not be happy with the broad minimalist
framework of my discussion. They will insist that the commitments they attribute to
realism e.g., theses about what it is for a normative fact to obtain, or about the na-
ture of normative beliefs rely on heavyweight metaphysical machinery, and cannot be
reinterpreted as first-order normative claims. Indeed, they will argue, these metaphysical
19As Wright (1992) put it: “[I]f there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism,’ as a
philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various
debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about (...) ethics, has probably,
for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.” (p. 1)
20Rosen (1998), pp. 397-8, raises a similar worry about defining realism in explanatory terms: we could
only state an explanatory conflict between quasi-realism and a realism according to which the relevant
facts causally explain our beliefs about them, but normative realists need not make any such causal
claims. Blackburn himself sometimes acknowledges this worry see the Introduction and Essay 1 in
Blackburn (1993). But no comprehensive treatment has been offered yet of potential explanatory criteria
for normative realism and why they all fail to draw a divide with Expressivism.
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commitments succeed in drawing a divide between Expressivism and realism precisely
in virtue of being immune to a minimalist, internalizing treatment.21 The divide between
Expressivism and realism only collapses if we assume a highly contentious reading of
realist commitments, and moreover, the rejection of this way of interpreting metaphysical
claims should itself be seen as part of genuine realism. Or so the objection would go.
I will do little to address these concerns in what follows. I agree that many self-
professed realists reject minimalism about metaphysical talk and take their commitments
to be irreducible to first-order normative theses, and there is not much I could say to
convince such realists that their view is compatible with Expressivism.22 Indeed, as
already mentioned in section 1, such realists would probably not see the need for this
discussion in the first place. They will be content to assert the existence of “robust”
normative truths and facts, and will reject the possibility of a minimalist appropriation
of these notions. The problem of creeping minimalism, which an explanatory criterion for
realism is supposed to solve, only arises if one assumes minimalism in the first place.
Thus, my paper is primarily addressed to minimalist expressivists, and to all those who
find it plausible that the only way to make sense of metaphysical talk in the normative
domain is to interpret it as an organic part of first-order normative theory. It is them
that I want to convince that there need be no explanatory divide between an expressivist
account of normative discourse and anything that we could recognize from a minimalist,
internalizing perspective as a general realism about normativity.
3 Divide at a deep metaphysical level?
Let us begin with a notion of realism that is not defined in terms of our connections be
they psychological, epistemic, or semantic with the normative realm, but concerns the
nature of normative facts as such.23 In doing so, I should note, we start with something
that expressivists themselves would not find useful in this discussion: Blackburn and
Gibbard insist that it is only in the explanation of our normative thought and practices
that realists and expressivists diverge, not in anything they might say about the internal
structure of the normative domain. However, other philosophers have found this route
promising in trying to articulate realist commitments incompatible with Expressivism.
I will argue that, at least if we interpret metaphysical explanations involving normative
facts as internal to normative theorizing, in the way that minimalist expressivists do,
there is no conflict to be found here.
21Most if not all of those mentioned in fn. 17 are likely to have this reaction.
22This is not to say that I will only argue for the compatibility between Expressivism and “minimal”
realism. From a minimalist perspective, the versions of realism that Expressivism is compatible with
are as metaphysically weighty as they can intelligibly be. In particular, I will argue that Expressivism is
compatible, by its own lights, with non-naturalist realism, although self-described “robust” non-naturalist
realists might not recognize this convergence due to their rejection of minimalism.
23This is in the spirit of Fine’s (2001) exhortation to metaphysical innocence in addressing the question
of realism: “[T]he existence of an external reality may make it plausible that our linguistic and epistemic
contact with that reality is of a certain sort, [but] this is not in what the externality of the reality
consists. In thinking about these matters, we need to restore ourselves to a state of innocence in which
the metaphysical claims are seen to be about the subject-matter in question (...) and not about our
relationship to that subject-matter.” (p. 7) I should note, however, that Fine ultimately offers a criterion
for realism that involves explanations of mental and linguistic content, rather than purely the nature of
the facts in the disputed domain. I discuss this type of proposal in section 6.
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We have already assumed that Expressivism is compatible with Objectivity un-
derstood in the sense that normative facts are counterfactually and constitutively in-
dependent of our attitudes. To use the same example again, we are supposing that
expressivists can legitimately claim that genocide would be wrong even if our attitudes
about it were different, and that it is not our attitudes that make genocide wrong, or
that make “Genocide is wrong” true. For minimalist expressivists, explaining such facts
is a task in normative theorizing, and our attitudes need not play any role here. The
normative explanation of what makes “Genocide is wrong” true may itself express a set of
conative attitudes, but this semantic fact has no import for what should go into the ex-
planation. Importantly, expressivists need not refrain from talking about truthmakers, or
about things having normative properties, in such explanations. But this metaphysical-
sounding talk is given a minimalist account, which means the explanations can be more
simply phrased in straightforwardly normative terms: e.g., genocide is wrong because of
the unnecessary suffering it involves, and not because we disapprove of it.24
Some philosophers have proposed that, even if we assume this compatibility between
Expressivism and Objectivity, we can articulate realist commitments incompatible
with expressivism at a deeper metaphysical level. Expressivists may well explain what
makes genocide wrong, or why“genocide is wrong” is true, without invoking our attitudes,
but they must evince their anti-realism, it is suggested, when explaining what it is for
something to have a normative property, or why normative claims have the truthmakers
that they do.25
Let us state then a notion of realism along these lines:
Realism-Met The metaphysical explanation of what it is for a normative fact to obtain,
or of why any normative claim has the truthmakers that it does, does not
involve our attitudes.
Note that Realism-Met is not entailed by Objectivity. There is logical room for
someone to hold that our attitudes do not make normative claims true, and normative
truths would be the same no matter what our attitudes were, and yet that our attitudes
help explain why this is so. For example, one might claim that it is because of the
24To be sure, Blackburn and Gibbard are not very fond of metaphysical talk. In particular, they
often resist expanding their minimalism to claims about normative properties. Gibbard (2003), Ch. 5,
prefers to speak of natural properties that realize normative concepts, rather than accept the existence
of normative properties as such. Blackburn’s attitude to property talk has been more ambivalent. In
Blackburn (1984) he claimed that the world does not contain moral properties, while in Blackburn (1993)
he adopted a minimalist account of properties. Most recently, in Blackburn (2015), he has reverted to a
reluctant attitude when it comes to property talk, preferring to think of himself as inhabiting “a world
in which there are only natural properties, including ones to which we often have moral and evaluative
attitudes” (p. 844). But, as Blackburn’s own changes of mind show, Expressivism does not mandate any
position on the existence of normative properties.
25Jenkins (2005) defines realism in these terms, as a thesis about what it is for normative facts to
obtain. Applied to our example, her proposal is that a realist holds that what it is for genocide to be
wrong involves the essence of genocide and wrongness, while an expressivist claims that something’s
being wrong is a matter of our taking a negative attitude toward it. Similarly, Asay (2013) argues that,
although realists and expressivists might agree on what the truthmakers for normative claims are, they
nevertheless offer conflicting explanations of the truthmaking relations themselves. Realists talk about
the de re properties of objects in accounting for why the relevant truthmaking relations hold, he says,
while expressivists must appeal to our attitudes being projected onto the world when explaining the same
facts. Sometimes, Asay switches to semantic facts as explananda: realists and expressivists give different
accounts of disagreement, he says, and in particular of what makes it the case that our words are about
certain things. As already mentioned, I discuss this option in section 6.
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way our attitudes are projected onto the world that the following objectivist claim is
true: genocide would be wrong no matter what anyone thought about it, and it is wrong
because of the suffering it causes, not because we have certain attitudes towards it. In
other words, on such a view, our attitudes do not explain the normative facts, but they
are part of the explanation for why they do not explain normative facts.
To be sure, this is an odd position in logical space. But let us not assess the inde-
pendent merits of combining Objectivity with the rejection of Realism-Met in this
way. What matters for our purposes is whether expressivists must reject Realism-Met,
and thus adopt the view sketched above. I see no reason why. Blackburn and Gibbard
might not be particularly interested in such questions as why normative claims have the
truthmakers that they do. But their objectivist track record suggests that, if they did
consider these questions, they would treat such explanatory contexts as normative ones,
and deny that our attitudes have any role to play here. Just as they hold that what
makes genocide wrong has nothing to do with our attitudes, expressivists can very well
claim that what it is for genocide to be wrong is not to be explicated in terms of how we
feel about it, but rather by appealing to the attitude-independent properties of genocide
and their normative import. In any case, Expressivism does not entail any particular
stance on these matters.26
Now, proponents of Realism-Met might insist that the metaphysical explanations
they have in mind are not to be reinterpreted as normative explanations in disguise, but
rather should be taken for what they are: genuine metaphysical explanations, relying
on heavyweight metaphysical tools. Insofar as expressivists refuse to acknowledge the
legitimacy of metaphysical talk that evades an expressivist account, it might be argued,
we can locate here the contrast between their lightweight objectivism and the robust
Realism-Met that unabashed metaphysicians can endorse.
However, this only brings us back to the familiar situation in which self-professed
metaphysical realists reassure themselves that their view cannot be reconciled with Ex-
pressivism, while from the minimalist side there is no intelligible contrast to be seen.
Minimalist expressivists need not think of themselves as rejecting Realism-Met un-
derstood as a metaphysical claim, but rather as giving such metaphysical talk the only
intelligible reading it can be given.27 Insofar as there is a dispute here, it is a metameta-
26In her discussion, Jenkins assumes not only that expressivism is a form of anti-realism, but also
that expressivists are anti-realists in the very sense captured by her proposal: expressivists must accept
that what it is for something to be wrong is dependent on our attitudes, she argues, if they are not to
contradict their anti-realism. This is a questionable move in the context of defending said proposal as
an account of what separates expressivists from realists, especially giventhe existence of other options,
such as Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s own explanatory criteria for realism. Asay also takes it for granted
that expressivists will appeal to projection from our attitudes in explaining truthmaking relations in the
normative domain. But, while Blackburn fueled this reading of expressivism by relying on the notion of
projection in earlier writings (1984), he has since abandoned this misleading metaphor. In Blackburn
(2010), p. 32, he explains that he did so precisely because this metaphor might have raised the suspicion
that he ultimately accepts the attitude-dependence of normative facts.
27Blackburn (2010): “But what about the metaethicist, trying to understand the Place of Value in the
World as a whole? (. . . ) There is (. . . ) a wrong way to proceed, which is to invoke an alleged distinction
between an ‘internal’ (. . . ) dependency claim, and an ‘external’ or ‘transcendental’ one. (. . . ) Suppose
we don metaethical clothing, and ask in what we hope to be an upper-case, metaethical tone of voice, ‘Do
Values as such depend on our Sentiments or our Wills as such?’ We still have to answer by considering
examples. So, for instance, does the value of the selfless act of benevolence depend on our sentiments, or
does the awfulness of unmotivated cruelty depend on our willing to avoid it (. . . )? And now the claim
is that we can hear these as other than requests for first-order (. . . ) dependency tests. But we cannot
10
physical one about how to interpret certain metaphysical explanations, rather than a
metaphysical one about whether Realism-Met is true or not.28 In any case, in this pa-
per I am interested in whether minimalist expressivists must see a conflict between their
view and realism, given their internalizing approach to metaphysical issues. We will not
find such a contrast if we focus on anything like Realism-Met.
* * *
Let us forget then about any notion of realism defined in terms of the metaphysical
structure of the normative domain itself. Expressivism and its explanatory ambitions
have no import for what makes normative claims true and why.
We should also put aside the idea that the divide between Expressivism and realism
might be located in how they see the role of normative facts when it comes to explaining
facts outside the normative domain: for instance, that realism might consist in ascribing
a causal role to normative facts in explanations of historical events like revolutions and
genocides,29 or even a non-causal role in such explanations.30 While some realists might
embrace explanatory commitments of this kind, most do not. Non-naturalist realists, in
particular, standardly reject the causal efficacy of normative facts.31 Thus, any notion of
realism that involves a causal-explanatory role for normative facts is a dead end in this
discussion.32 Even fewer realists, I suspect, would appeal to normative facts in non-causal
explanations of phenomena unrelated to our normative beliefs and linguistic practices.
If we are to find a plausible notion of realism defined in explanatory terms and in-
compatible with Expressivism, our only hope is to shift our attention to the psychology,
epistemology and semantics of normative discourse. After all, Expressivism does pur-
port to explain a range of facts about normative thought and language, and it claims to
do so by appealing to our affective and practical reactions to non-normative facts. It has
seemed plausible to many, including Blackburn and Gibbard, that this is where we can
find a contrast between Expressivism and realism, because realists assign a central role
to normative facts in accounting for the same mental and linguistic phenomena.
In the next sections I will examine three different kinds of facts with respect to which,
according to Blackburn and Gibbard, there is an explanatory conflict between Expres-
sivism and realism: (i) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (ii)
(. . . ) There is no external question of dependency. (...) We might be tempted to think that there must
be one, that people must be dragged willi-nilly into the halls of metaphysics. But this would only be so
if we ignore expressivism.” (pp. 30-2)
28Dunaway (2010) makes a similar point: the difference between expressivism and realism cannot
simply consist in a disagreement about the meaning of metaphysical claims that they both accept,
e.g. that there are normative truths. Rather, he says, the two views must disagree about some “deep or
substantive claims” (p. 355).
29I have in mind the naturalist realism developed by Sturgeon (1985), and his examples of a revolution
being caused by the unjustness of a political regime, or of Hitler’s actions being caused by his depravity.
30See Wright’s (1992) wide cosmological role conception of realism: a domain of facts is objective in
this sense if it has a wide influence not necessarily a causal one on other domains of facts, excluding
our beliefs or linguistic practices.
31See Shafer-Landau (2006) and Enoch (2011), among others.
32Moreover, Gibbard has actually been more willing to accept the legitimacy of causal explanations
involving normative facts than many self-professed realists see Gibbard (2003), Ch. 10. More on the
compatibility between Expressivism and such causal explanations, in section 5.
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our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, and (iii) facts about mental and lin-
guistic content, e.g. what it is for someone to think that genocide is wrong, or for two
people to disagree about whether genocide is wrong.33 In each case I will look for a notion
of realism characterized in terms of the explanatory role it ascribes to normative facts,
and then will examine whether realism thus defined is incompatible with Expressivism.
In case (i), it is relatively easy to show that there is no such conflict, if only because it is
hard to articulate a relevant notion of realism. Cases (ii) and (iii) are more complicated:
we can isolate there an explanatory project incompatible with Expressivism, namely
a tracking account according to which normative facts causally explain the emergence
and evolution of normative thought and language. However, I will argue, this cannot be
accepted as a general criterion for normative realism.
4 Realism and motivation
Let’s assume that judgment internalism or something close to it is true: making a nor-
mative judgment is associated, at least in normal circumstances, with being in a certain
motivational state. (Most realists will accept at least this weak version of internalism, so
I will ignore the possibility that the rejection of this claim might be built into the notion
of realism.)
Expressivists usually take pride in their explanation of the motivational valence of
normative judgments. On standard versions of expressivism, normative thoughts the
mental states expressed by sincere utterances of normative claims are identical to, or
constituted in part by, desire-like mental states. This explains the connection between
normative judgment and motivation, without entailing that we will always act in accor-
dance with our normative judgments: the motivational pull of the mental states that
constitute such judgments can be overridden by other motivational states.
Expressivists also typically claim that realism does not provide resources to explain the
connection between normative judgment and motivation. They may be right. However,
this by itself cannot constitute a divide between Expressivism and realism: the mere
fact that realism leaves something unexplained, which expressivism accounts for, only
means that realists would have something to gain from Expressivism, if the views were
otherwise compatible. If something in realism was incompatible with the expressivist
explanation of judgment internalism, we would of course have a conflict here. But we
have not found that something yet.
If we try to articulate a realist explanation of judgment internalism that would be
in tension with Expressivism, in particular an explanation involving normative facts
and properties, we run into a simple problem. How could normative facts which many
realists take to be causally inefficacious explain the fact of being motivated by one’s
normative judgments? Few realists would even accept that it is one of their tasks to
33Here I am using explanation in a broad sense, such that one can explain what it is for something to
be the case, even though no claim of the form “p because q” plays a central role in the explanation.
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explain psychological phenomena of this kind, let alone that they should appeal to our
contact with normative facts in such explanations.34
It might be suggested that, although realists do not usually try to offer causal expla-
nations of such psychological facts, they do offer a different account of the connection
between normative judgment and motivation, namely that this connection is normative.
That is, realists will claim that one ought to be motivated by one’s normative judgments,
or that a rational agent will be properly motivated by her normative judgments.35
However, why should this be in conflict with Expressivism? Expressivists can endorse
such normative assessments of agents who are motivated by their normative judgments,
especially given that these assessments are naturally read as concerning the rationality of
acting in accordance with one’s judgments rather than the rationality of simply being
in some motivational state, which may not lead one to action.36 As already mentioned,
expressivists do not deny the rather obvious fact that there is sometimes a mismatch
between our normative judgments and our actions. Thus, Expressivism poses no obstacle
to judging that people whose actions are aligned in the right way with their normative
judgments are rational, or acting as they ought to.
There would only be a conflict between Expressivism and realism on this issue if we
attributed the following position to realists: there is no constitutive connection between
normative judgments and motivational states; normative beliefs only have representa-
tional content and a mind-to-world direction of fit, and always require the presence of
appropriate desires in order to produce motivation and action. But this would amount, in
effect, to building the rejection of Expressivism into the definition of realism, which would
beg the question at stake here.37 As I argued before, while it may be true that many or
even most self-professed realists reject Expressivism, this sociological fact cannot settle
the issue of whether realists must reject Expressivism, in virtue of their realism.38 We
haven’t seen yet any reason to think that they must, and in particular no reason having
to do with a realist explanation of the motivational valence of normative judgments.
5 Beliefs and convergence
Blackburn and Gibbard often attribute the following thesis to realists: our normative
beliefs are explained by the normative facts. This realist commitment is supposed to be in
conflict with an expressivist explanation of our tendencies in making normative judgments,
34See Scanlon (2010), who holds that normative facts need not be “causally active in producing actions.
It is an agent’s acceptance of a judgment about the reasons he or she has that does this. Such acceptance,
whether it amounts to belief or not, is a psychological state, and hence the kind of thing that figures in
ordinary psychological explanations.” (p. 12)
35See Scanlon (2014), Lecture 3.
36Indeed, Scanlon (2014) explicitly focuses on the connection between normative judgment and action
(see p. 53).
37Note that, in a minimalist-expressivist framework, normative judgments are both desire-like attitudes
and truth-apt beliefs. So the mere fact that, for realists, normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs with
a mind-to-world direction of fit is not enough to draw a contrast with Expressivism. The question is
whether anything in realism as such entails that normative judgments do not also have a world-to-mind
direction of fit, or why minimalist expressivists should think of realism as including such a commitment.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I address this issue.
38Moreover, see Nagel (1970) for an example of a realist who holds that normative judgments do not
require the presence of external desires in order to produce motivation and action.
13
which does not involve cognitive responses to normative facts. As Blackburn (1999) puts
it, in relation to moral judgments: “Our moral understandings are not explained by
independent moral structures, to which we are lucky enough to be sensitive.”39 Similarly,
Gibbard (2003) contrasts an expressivist explanation of normative belief, which does not
help itself to normative facts, to a “standard realist’s mode of explanation,” which starts
with a realm of facts to explain belief in them.40
This idea resembles Bernard Williams’ (1985) contrast between science and ethics.
Williams argues that science has a kind of objectivity that ethics lacks, namely an objec-
tivity manifested in the different explanations of agreement and disagreement available in
the two domains. There is a clear contrast, he says, between the best explanation of the
substantial degree of convergence in the history of Western science, which involves the
idea that we reflected a world that was already there, and the ethical case, where there
is no hope for convergence on ethical truths to be explained by the fact that our beliefs
reflect the ethical world.41
Let us state then a version of realism in these terms:
Realism-Bel The best explanation of normative beliefs, and of any large-scale conver-
gence thereof, involves a central role for normative facts as what normative
beliefs cognitively respond to.42
On the most natural reading, Realism-Bel commits one to the availability of a certain
kind of causal explanation of normative beliefs and their convergence: namely, an ex-
planation according to which we tend to have the normative beliefs that we do, and to
converge on true beliefs under suitable circumstances, because we are in causal contact
with normative facts.
Thus read, Realism-Bel entails that normative thought has the etiological func-
tion of tracking normative facts, which directly contradicts the Negative Functional
Thesis of Expressivism. For expressivists, the emergence and proliferation of normative
concepts and beliefs is not explained by causal interactions between our cognitive system
and the normative realm.
39Blackburn (1999), p. 217. See also Blackburn (2013), where he draws a contrast between realism
about tables and chairs, manifested in the commitment that we are causally influenced by and sensitive
to the properties of tables and chairs, and the normative case, where we can forget about the existence
of normative facts and offer an anthropological or genealogical account which does not involve our first-
order commitments. This suggests that Blackburn understands normative realism as committed to a
genealogical account of our normative beliefs, in which normative facts play a crucial explanatory role.
40Gibbard (2003), p. 183.
41Williams (1985), pp. 135-6. To be clear, the issue is not how much disagreement there is in ethics,
nor whether the methods for settling ethical disagreements are as reliable as those available in science,
but rather whether the best overall explanation of convergence in ethical beliefs, to the extent that such
convergence happens, involves the idea that our beliefs represent normative facts.
42This proposal resembles Crispin Wright’s (1992) Cognitive Command conception of realism. They
both cash out the question of realism as a question of whether our beliefs in the given domain are
best understood as cognitive responses to the facts. But there are some differences. Wright’s Cognitive
Command consists in the impossibility of cognitively faultless disagreement in the disputed domain, and
is only meant to work as a test for realism in epistemically constrained regions of discourse. In contrast,
Realism-Bel allows for the existence of unknowable facts, and therefore leaves open the possibility of
brute error about said facts that is, error that cannot be explained by the malfunctioning of some
cognitive mechanism. Another respect in which the notion of realism stated above follows Williams’
understanding of objectivity rather than Wright’s Cognitive Command proposal is its focus on an entire
domain of facts and the best overall explanation of our tendencies in forming beliefs about those facts,
rather than on explanations of individual beliefs.
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However, this explanatory contrast cannot constitute a divide between realism and
Expressivism, as it would leave of out much of what goes for normative realism in con-
temporary philosophy. Most non-naturalist realists, in particular, claim that normative
facts are not causally efficacious, and therefore cannot subscribe to Realism-Bel as in-
terpreted above.43 That is, they cannot purport to offer a tracking account of normative
thought an anthropological story according to which normative facts causally explain
why we developed normative concepts and why we tend to form the beliefs that we do in
various circumstances.
To be sure, some realists do ascribe a causal-explanatory role to non-natural normative
facts in the production of our beliefs.44 However, this is a minority position among
contemporary non-naturalists. It might even deserve its own label say, supernaturalist
realism. In any case, such an explanatory commitment is not a plausible criterion for
normative realism in general.
Other realists might make claims about normative beliefs and their convergence on the
truth that resemble Realism-Bel: e.g., “We believe p because it is true” understanding
such claims as ways of our reassuring ourselves that we are on the right track, but not
as psychological explanations in which normative truths play a causal role. This is not
to say that such explanations cannot have a causal dimension. For instance, any non-
naturalist realist can hold that certain facts about our psychological processes, subjective
make-up, and our interaction with the environment causally explain why we arrived at
our normative beliefs, and then claim that the causal factors cited in the psychological
explanation are also truth-conducive: we paid attention to the relevant non-normative
facts, we reasoned properly, we showed the right degree of empathy, etc. But this does
not involve ascribing causal powers to normative facts, and is compatible with a fully
naturalistic story about the origins of our beliefs. The realist explanation only adds to
the naturalistic story a normative assessment of our psychological features and belief-
forming processes. Expressivists should have no issue with this.
Nonetheless, expressivists have shown discontent with the realists’ epistemological
picture, even when explicitly discussing varieties of realism that deny a causal-explanatory
role for normative facts. Take the following passage from Gibbard (2012):
“Non-naturalism starts its explanation with distinct realms into which we
can inquire: the natural realm, the abstract realm of mathematics, the nor-
mative realm (...) For each realm, there are appropriate methods of inquiry.
These methods are ways of coming to know the layouts of things in their
respective realms.” (p. 235)
For Gibbard, this realist story is in tension with an expressivist approach, on which we
start with non-normative facts and our attitudes and build our way up from there.
43Besides Shafer-Landau (2006) and Enoch (2011), see also Scanlon (2014), or Dworkin’s (1996) remarks
on “moral field theory” a parody of the kind of realism that would attribute a causal role to moral facts
in explanations of beliefs.
44FitzPatrick (2014, 2015) makes such claims in responding to evolutionary debunking arguments
against moral realism. See also Oddie (2005): “Values can affect us, causally, and it is through their
causal impact on us that we can have knowledge of value.” (p. 2)
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But what is the conflict supposed to consist in? Again, (most) non-naturalist realists
cannot be offering an account of cognitive success that presupposes the causal efficacy of
normative facts. Rather, they are talking about how to inquire into normative matters, or
about what goes well when our beliefs converge on the truth, in a way that expressivists
should find innocuous: there are normative facts and methods of inquiry appropriate for
discovering them; when people use such methods correctly, they tend to form true beliefs,
so their beliefs tend to converge.
Indeed, when expressivists put on their normative hat and engage in epistemological
theorizing, we should expect them to start with normative facts and our responses to them,
just as much as realists do. Moreover, they can even adopt the various epistemological
terms found in realist literature. For instance, they can speak of intuition, rationality as
responsiveness to reasons, or even normative perception; they have no reason to treat any
of these notions as off-limits, as long as they make it clear that in using such terms they
do not thereby commit to a tracking account of normative thought.45
We can already conclude that there is no general conflict between Expressivism and
realism when it comes to explaining normative beliefs, given that expressivists need not
object to what most non-naturalist realists will say on this topic.
Let me end this section, however, by pointing out that the compatibility between
Expressivism and the many faces of realism goes even deeper. Not only can expressivists
endorse the role that normative facts play in a non-causal realist epistemology, but they
can even accept a causal role for normative facts in some explanations of normative
beliefs. A first step would be to hold that normative properties are identical to the non-
normative properties on which they supervene a metaphysical thesis that is compatible
with Expressivism. (Indeed, Gibbard comes close to accepting such a thesis when he
argues that normative concepts are realized by natural properties and that there is no need
to posit irreducibly normative properties.)46 If expressivists were to accept such property
identity claims, they could ascribe the same explanatory roles to normative properties that
their natural counterparts have. In particular, they could accept explanations in which
normative properties themselves are understood to play a causal role in the production
of our beliefs, e.g. “I believe that burning cats is wrong because it is wrong.” It can
hardly be disputed, after all, that the very natural features that make an act wrong also
causally influence many of our beliefs about wrongness, or more generally that many of our
normative beliefs are caused in part by the supervenience bases of normative properties.
45This is not to say that expressivists should find all of these ways of speaking appealing. They might
find some of them better suited than others for communicating confidence in our normative judgments
and belief-forming processes. Blackburn, as a good Humean, is more sympathetic to perception talk and
usually dismissive of rationalist approaches to the epistemology of the normative. He argues, for instance,
that an agent whose moral judgments are off-track because his psychology is not that of normal socialized
human beings should not be diagnosed as displaying dysfunctions of rationality: “We can exhort [him]
(...) to share our sentiments. We can try to turn up the volume of his feelings for those whom he exploits.
What we cannot do is argue the knave back into upright behavior.” (Blackburn 1998a, p. 209) As for
perception talk, this is legitimate, he argues, whenever we think of ourselves as properly indicating the
truth. But we must be careful to understand such talk in a “low-grade” sense, making it clear that we are
not committed to the availability of a naturalistic account of perceptual success in the normative domain
(Blackburn 1993, p. 170).
46Gibbard (2003), Ch. 5.
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What Expressivism must reject is a robust causal explanation that depicts our nor-
mative beliefs and evaluative tendencies as cognitive responses to normative facts. Ac-
cording to Expressivism, normative thought did not emerge as a faculty for tracking
normative facts, but rather as a tool for social coordination. Thus, we could have en-
gaged in normative thought and discourse even while being vastly off-track in our norma-
tive judgments, as long as our beliefs and linguistic practices displayed the affective and
motivational profiles required for fulfilling this coordination function. So, even though
expressivists may accept that some normative beliefs are caused in part by interactions
with normative facts, they cannot accept that normative beliefs in general, and any con-
vergence thereof, are the outputs of cognitive mechanisms whose function is to track nor-
mative facts.47 Such a representationalist account of the etiology of normative thought
is incompatible with Expressivism. But, as I argued above, it cannot be accepted as a
general criterion for normative realism.
6 Erasing the semantic divide
Surely, it might be thought, realism and Expressivism offer different accounts of the
content of normative thought and language, and thus of what it is in virtue of which
we disagree on normative issues. Even if expressivists can accommodate, in a minimal-
ist framework, much of what realists say about these matters e.g., any claims about
the truth conditions of normative claims, or the extension of normative predicates they
must hold that such realist talk is explanatorily idle, and that only the attitudinal se-
mantics of expressivism provides genuine insights into the nature of normative content.
Realists, in contrast, reject the Semantic Thesis and hold that the right account of
normative content is a representationalist one, in which normative facts and properties
play a substantive explanatory role.
Let us see how this contrast is supposed to work.48 Take two sincere utterances of a
normative sentence and its negation:
Bill: “Genocide is wrong.”
Clara: “Genocide is not wrong.”
What accounts for the fact that Bill and Clara are in disagreement? Before the advent
of quasi-realism, the divide between realists and expressivists on these issues was easy
to state. Realists would say that the two utterances express contradictory propositional
47Someone might worry that expressivists cannot avoid accepting a tracking account of normative
thought, once they allow for causal explanations involving normative properties: if normative properties
play a causal role in the explanations of most true normative beliefs, doesn’t that entail that normative
thought has the etiological function of tracking such properties? The answer is no. A tracking account
must be more robust than an explanation that merely points to the effects of normative properties
on people who form true normative beliefs. It should account for the representational relations between
normative thought and normative facts in any scenario in which there are normative concepts and beliefs.
Only such an explanation would vindicate the idea of normative thought as a system of cognitive responses
to normative facts. But according to Expressivism, the supervenience bases of normative properties will
feature in causal explanations of normative beliefs only in a narrow range of evolutionary pathways:
species similar to us in many respects could have developed normative concepts and converged in their
beliefs even while responding to all the wrong natural properties.
48I focus on linguistic content here, but what I say can be extended to mental content, with minor
adjustments.
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contents involving the concept of wrongness, which stands for the property of wrongness.
Expressivists, on the other hand, would reject this explanation and propose instead a story
about the incompatible attitudes expressed by the two utterances: for instance, that Bill
expresses disapproval of genocide, while Clara expresses, say, an attitude of indifference
toward genocide.49
Minimalist expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard, however, are comfortable with
the vocabulary of representational semantics, e.g. with using the notions of truth-conditions,
propositional content, reference, etc. Thus, they need not reject anything in the realist
story cited above: they can agree, for instance that“Genocide is wrong” is true if and only
if it is a fact that genocide is wrong, or that “wrong” stands for the property of wrongness,
taking these to be tautologies that capture the grammar of the words “true,”“fact,” and
“property”. They can also agree, in the same minimalist framework, that “Genocide is
wrong” represents the fact that genocide has the property of wrongness. What they deny
is the explanatory value of such a thesis: it merely rehearses a commonsense normative
commitment, they argue, and therefore cannot be an illuminating explication of the con-
tent of “Genocide is wrong”. The expressivist story about disagreement in attitude, in
contrast, is supposed to offer genuine explanations of normative content, and thus of what
makes it the case that people are in normative disagreement.
It is important to note two things about this potential explanatory contrast between
Expressivism and realism. First, it is significantly different from the options we have
considered before. Blackburn and Gibbard do not reject the representationalist semantic
picture. Rather, they identify a more subtle tension between Expressivism and realism
defined in semantic terms: the functional theses and the attitudinal semantics of Ex-
pressivism provide genuine insight into the nature of normative content, in contrast to
the explanatory idleness of semantic claims about truth conditions, extensions, etc. As
Blackburn (1993) puts it:
“[T]he extra ingredients the realist adds (. . . ) are pulling no explanatory
weight: they just sit on top of the story that tells how our sentiments relate
to natural features of things.”50
According to realism, as expressivists construe it, representationalist theses about nor-
mative facts and properties do illuminate the nature of normative discourse.
49I am only using the approval/disapproval model as an example of an attitudinal semantics I do not
mean to suggest that it is an obvious choice for expressivists.
50Blackburn (1993), p. 155. See also Blackburn (2015): even though we cannot do without a notion of
representation, he argues, “for it is a harmless part of everyday thought (...) representation is nevertheless
not the key concept to deploy when the desire for philosophical explanation of our practice (...) is upon us.
It is not the way to understand the kind of thought or the part of language in question, whereas a different
focus on the function of terms in the lives of thinkers and talkers, is the better option.” (pp. 851-2) Or
Gibbard (2012): “[Both expressivism and non-naturalist realism aim] to explain the crucial features of
normative thinking. Non-naturalists explain these features by parallels to the plainest cases of property
attributions like, for instance, (. . . ) whether the cat is on the mat. Expressivists recognize these
parallels, but think they aren’t basic. (...) What’s crucial to normative thinking isn’t how it bears on
the non-natural layout of the world, but how it bears on action and the like.” (pp. 218-9)
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Secondly, this explanatory divide should be recognizable from a minimalist standpoint.
It should not amount to a conflict between a minimalist approach to representational-
ist talk and a view according to which truth and referential relations play substantive
explanatory roles in semantic theory. To be sure, many realists might subscribe to an
inflationary conception of truth-conditional semantics, just as many realists think of their
view as a substantive metaphysical thesis, irreducible to a position in first-order nor-
mative theory. But the divide between minimalist and inflationary understandings of
metaphysical and semantic notions is not what we are looking for. Blackburn and Gib-
bard assume minimalism about truth, facthood, representation, etc. as the only way to
make sense of such notions, and understand realism as a commitment to the explanatory
value of representationalist theses within this framework: e.g., if we want to understand
what “Genocide is wrong” is about and the nature of disagreement about such claims,
we must talk about wrongness itself. This is what they take to be incompatible with
Expressivism.
Let us state then a version of realism in semantic terms:
Realism-Con Normative facts and properties play a substantive explanatory role in
the best account of the semantic content of normative discourse.51
Blackburn and Gibbard reject Realism-Con on the grounds that it is flat-footed and
unilluminating to appeal to normative facts and properties when attempting to elucidate
the content of normative claims: if someone claims that “Genocide is wrong” represents
the fact that genocide has the property of wrongness, she is not making a mistake, but
nor is she providing any insight into the nature of normative content.
However, I believe Expressivism can be reconciled with Realism-Con. It is pre-
cisely because expressivists treat representationalist claims as internal to normative dis-
course that they need not see such theses as less illuminating than Expressivism from
a general philosophical perspective.52 Expressivists, again, do not deny that in using
normative language we are engaging with normative facts for instance, that “Genocide
is wrong” is true in virtue of the fact that genocide has indeed the property of wrongness,
etc. interpreting such commitments as organic parts of normative theorizing. But then
why should they not recognize the value of such claims, from the same normative stand-
point? Representationalist theses may not explain the origins of normative language, or
the social and psychological workings of normative disagreement. However, from a nor-
mative point of view, we can say that the representational success of “Genocide is wrong”
is a fundamental feature of this normative claim, or that the disagreement between Bill
51Fine (2001), Dreier (2004), and Dunaway (Forthcoming) offer proposals along these lines. However,
they would likely object to the minimalist framework in which I examine this notion of realism. Again,
my focus here is on whether thoroughgoing minimalists must see an explanatory divide between Expres-
sivism and realism, so I am only considering construals of realism compatible with minimalism about
metaphysical notions and representationalist semantics.
52To be sure, minimalist expressivists will not treat all representationalist semantic theses as first-order
normative claims. On their account, many such theses hold simply in virtue of the grammar of terms like
“truth”, “fact”, or “property”: e.g., “Genocide is wrong” is true if and only if genocide is true, or the claim
that the disagreement between Bill and Clara is about whether genocide has the property of wrongness.
Such theses are neutral with respect to normative issues.
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and Clara is about wrongness and is settled by the fact that genocide is wrong, not by
anything about the mental states expressed by their claims. It is possible to accept Ex-
pressivism and acknowledge at the same time the importance of representationalist talk
when it comes to capturing the successes and failures of our normative commitments.
It is not a tenet of Expressivism as such that Expressivism is more philosophically
illuminating than normative discourse. Therefore, there need be no explanatory tension
between Expressivism andRealism-Con if representationalist talk is treated as internal
to normative theorizing.53
At this point, someone might suggest that the explanatory contrast between Expres-
sivism and realism is not to be found by looking at their semantic theses, but rather at
a meta-semantic level: expressivists may well accept representationalist theses about the
semantic contents of normative expressions, but won’t they disagree with realists when
it comes to explaining why normative expressions have these contents? Expressivists will
talk about our conative attitudes and how utterances expressing such attitudes get to be-
have semantically as ordinary descriptive claims, it might be thought, while realists will
appeal instead to normative facts and properties in their meta-semantic explanations.54
For instance, a realist will hold that the existence of a property of wrongness explains
why “Genocide is wrong” has the meaning assigned to it by a standard truth-conditional
semantics, and this is something that expressivists cannot accept. Or so the argument
would go.
The problem with this proposal is that it does not fit in a minimalist framework.
Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s minimalism about representationalist talk entails that many
semantic facts need no deeper explanation: for example, the fact that“Genocide is wrong”
is true just in case genocide is wrong. On their view, such tautologies simply follow from
the grammar of the word “true”. Some realists might reject this deflationary picture
and purport to offer substantive explanations of the same semantic facts, relying on the
connections between our language and the normative realm, e.g. the referential relation
between the predicate “wrong” and the property of wrongness. To be sure, this is an im-
portant philosophical disagreement. But it is only another instance of the more general
divide between minimalism and inflationism about metaphysical and semantic notions.
Realism thus defined, as a commitment to the explanatory value of representational rela-
tions in a theory of meaning, cannot be what Blackburn and Gibbard have in mind when
53Rosen (1998) arrives at a similar conclusion in his discussion of Blackburn’s quasi-realism: “[Quasi-
realism] licenses the whole-hearted assertion of everything the realist has ever wanted to say about the
objectivity and factuality of the domain at issue (. . . ) At the end of the day we have rather a pair of
equally legitimate representations of our thought in the area, with no clear basis for saying that either is
more revelatory of its nature than the other.” (pp. 400-1)
54Dunaway (Forthcoming) offers a proposal along these lines. This idea is consonant with recent
attempts to restate expressivism as a view in meta-semantics, which does not offer a psychologistic
semantics for normative discourse, but rather explains why normative expressions have the semantic
values that they do. See fn. 5 for examples of such proposals. Moreover, Chrisman (2012) has argued
that Blackburn’s own view is best interpreted as an account of why normative language fits a truth-
conditional semantic model, rather than as a semantic project, and that the view thus understood is
in conflict with a realist meta-semantic picture. Note, however, that the existence of a meta-semantic
divide between expressivism and realism need not depend on whether expressivists abandon the Semantic
Thesis or not. Even expressivists who offer an attitudinal semantics for normative discourse may try to
locate the conflict between their view and realism at the meta-semantic level. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for encouraging me to consider this meta-semantic option for drawing an explanatory divide
between expressivism and realism.
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they identify realism in logical space. From a minimalist standpoint, such a version of
realism is not a robust metaphysical view that should be rejected, but rather the product
of confusions about the nature of truth and representation.5556
If we focus on metasemantic explanations, the only realist picture incompatible with
Expressivism is, once more, a tracking account according to which normative facts and
properties causally explain the emergence and proliferation of normative terms as repre-
sentational devices: for instance, a causal theory of reference for normative terms, which
would be in conflict with the Negative Functional Thesis of Expressivism.57 How-
ever, as I argued before, accepting such an account cannot be seen as a requirement for
being a realist, as this would leave out too many views that should be covered by any
general criterion for normative realism.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that, if we assume a broad minimalist account of metaphysical notions and
representationalist semantics, there need be no explanatory divide between Expressivism
and anything recognizable as a general notion of realism. Therefore, assuming that“quasi-
realism” is indistinguishable from realism in all other respects, it should be considered a
form of genuine realism.
Many self-professed realists will not be impressed by this result, given the contentious
minimalism on which it stands. It is a devious reinterpretation of realist commitments,
they will argue, to treat such commitments as rehearsals of first-order normative claims,
or as mere reflections of the syntax and discipline of normative language. This dispute
between minimalist and inflationary approaches to metaphysical and semantic notions is
one of the most intractable in contemporary philosophy, and one which I have not tried
to resolve in this paper. But for those of us with a taste for minimalist landscapes, it is
time to declare Expressivism compatible with realism pure and simple, and to explore
the philosophical benefits of this reconciliation.58
55This is not to say that other expressivists may not acknowledge the usefulness of a representationalist
metasemantics in other domains of discourse and merely reject its application in the normative domain,
drawing thus a divide between their views and realism defined in metasemantic terms. My argument
here concerns thoroughgoing minimalist expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard. Here is another way
of stating why this metasemantic option for drawing a divide between Expressivism and realism does
not work in a minimalist framework: Blackburn and Gibbard do reject an inflationary approach to
representational metasemantics, according to which truth and referential relations play a substantive role
in explanations of semantic content, but this is something they reject with respect to any domain of
discourse. So this cannot be what they have in mind when they contrast their alleged anti-realism about
normativity with their realism about, e.g., physical objects.
56An anonymous referee suggests that, even in a minimalist framework, there might be a difference
between an expressivist and a realist account of semantic claims such as “‘Genocide is wrong’ is true
just in case genocide is wrong”: expressivists will talk about conative attitudes in explaining how we get
to make these claims. Realists will offer different explanations, which do not involve conative attitudes.
However, I believe we cannot find here a divide between Expressivism and realism. If expressivists
explain how conative attitudes get to behave semantically like ordinary descriptive beliefs, why should
this explanation be in tension with realism? Given that expressivists also endorse everything that realists
want to say about truth and representation in a minimalist framework, there is no reason for realists to
reject the additional story about conative attitudes lest we build the rejection of Expressivism into
the definition of realism, which again would be question-begging in this debate.
57Compare with the tracking account of normative belief discussed in section 5. These are in effect two
dimensions epistemological and semantic of the same kind of naturalist realism.
58I am grateful to Mart́ın Abreu Zavaleta, Brian Ballard, Cian Dorr, Hartry Field, Laura Franklin-
Hall, Jed Lewinsohn, Colin Marshall, Tom Nagel, Sharon Street, David Velleman, and two anonymous
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